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EXAMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES PRISONER
TRANSFER TREATIES
INTRODUCTION
In recent years the United States has demonstrated an increased
interest in participation and cooperation with other countries in penal
matters.' With two bilateral prisoner transfer treaties expected to
enter into force in 19852 and another presently under consideration by
the United States Senate, s it is appropriate to examine the origin and
nature of United States treaties currently in force on the same sub-
ject.' This note will do so using the constitutional limitations on the
executive, legislative and judicial branches in the treaty process as a
framework.
1. In 1980 and 1981, respectively, the United States entered into treaties with Colom-
bia and the Netherlands on mutual legal assistance. In 1982, the United States entered
into a treaty with Italy on mutual assistance in criminal matters. Beginning with the
Mexican treaty in 1976, the United States has also entered into six other treaties involv-
ing prisoner transfer. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
2. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Jan. 25, 1983, United States-
France, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. - (entered into force Feb. 1, 1985). Convention on the
Transfer of Sentenced Persons, March 21, 1983, Council of Europe, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S.
No. - (entered into force July 1, 1985).
3. Treaty on Cooperation in the Execution of Penal Sentences, Oct. 29, 1982, United
States-Thailand, TREATY Doc. No. 8, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982).
4. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text. The prisoner transfer treaties were
the first of their kind entered into by the United States. "While prior laws have imple-
mented extradition treaties, never before have we attempted to provide for imprison-
ment, probation and parole of Americans in this country as the result of foreign convic-
tions." Implementation of Treaties for the Transfer of Offenders to or from Foreign
Countries: Hearings on H.R. 7148 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship
and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1977) (statement of Rep. Eilberg) [hereinafter House Implementation Hearing]. Recog-
nition of foreign judgments is an iptegral part of such laws, but United States Federal
and state authorities cannot implement a sentence authorized by a competent court of
another nation, even at the latter's request. Chief Justice Marshall's long-followed dic-
tum states that "the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Ante-
lope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122-23 (1825). "Accordingly, in the absence of a treaty or
authorizing legislation, a person convicted of a crime and sentenced to imprisonment in
one jurisdiction cannot be confined in the prisons of another." George, Penal Jurisdic-
tion in Japan and the United States, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
15 (1983) (citing In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894)).
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY PROCESS AND THE
UNITED STATES PRISONER TRANSFER TREATIES
The validity of a treaty entered into by a state depends upon the
treaty's conformity with the limitations that state has placed on its
treaty process. In the United States, the constitutional limitations
that apply to all exercises of the federal power apply to treaties as
well. A constitutional limitation on the treaty process can be defined
as "any limitation or restriction contained in the fundamental law of a
state which prevents a state from entering into a treaty, or, having en-
tered into one, from performing the obligations incurred thereunder."7
The limitations thus can be classified as those affecting the capacity to
enter into a treaty and those affecting the performance of obligations
arising under a treaty.8
A. Capacity Limitations-The Involvement of the Executive
Branch
Capacity limitations "are those pertaining to the negotiation and
ratification of treaties." In the United States, the Constitution vests
the executive treaty-making authority in the President, with the pro-
viso that he obtain the advice and consent of the Senate.0 The Presi-
dent's role in the treaty-making process involves appointing and in-
5. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 882-83 (8th ed. 1962). In regard to a United
States treaty, "the only questions ... which can arise in the consideration of the valid-
ity of a treaty are: First, Is it a proper subject of treaty according to international law or
the usage and practice of civilized nations? Second, Is it prohibited by any of the limita-
tions in the Constitution?" People v. Gerke, 5 Cal. 381, 384 (1855).
6. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 137 (1975).
7. J. HENDRY, TREATIES AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS 6 (1955). "It is now accepted
that a treaty made in violation of a nation's constitution is nevertheless binding upon it
unless the violation is 'fundamental' and the other party knew or had reason to know the
lack of authority to make it." L. HENKIN, supra note 6, at 137. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 123 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
8. J. HENDRY, supra note 7, at 7. "[Tjhe nature of the constitutional structures of
federal states makes this classification important, and most necessary, for analyzing the
treaty processes of federal states." Id.
9. Id.
10. Article II, § 1 provides in pertinent part that "[tihe executive power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Article 11,
§ 2 further provides that "[the President] shall have the power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present
shall concur." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Alexander Hamilton suggested that the treaty-
making power be viewed as a function of a fourth branch of government, the President-




structing negotiators and following their progress in negotiations." If
he approves what they have negotiated, he requests the advice and
consent of the Senate. Upon obtaining such advice and consent, he can
then ratify or "make" the treaty. 2
A treaty made under executive auspices and ratified by two-thirds
of the Senate must "be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an
act of the legislature . . ... I" Not all treaties, however, are in fact the
law of the land of their own accord. "[Wihen the terms of the stipula-
tion import a contract .. . the legislature must execute the contract
before it can become a rule for the court."" Treaties designed to have
domestic consequences can be either "self-executing" or "non-self-exe-
cuting." 6 The former require no legislative intervention, whereas the
latter require an act of Congress to carry out the international obliga-
tion.16 Whether a treaty is one or the other is ordinarily a domestic
question, initially for the executive, who must decide whether to "take
care" that the treaty is "faithfully executed"'" as law or to seek imple-
mentation by Congress.'s
1. The Prisoner Transfer Treaties
During the Carter administration, the United States concluded bi-
lateral treaties on the execution of penal sentences with Mexico," Can-
11. L. HENKIN, supra note 6, at 130.
12. Id. "The Senate gives consent to ratification, the President ratifies, but even the
Supreme Court has erroneously referred to the Senate's action as 'ratification'. B. Alt-
man & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600-01 (1912); Wilson v. Girard 354 U.S. 524,
526 (1957). L. HENKIN, supra note 6, at 130.
13. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). This conclusion derives from
the Constitution: "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
14. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314. "[W]hen either of the parties engages to perform a
particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department;
thus requiring legislative action." Id. For example, "[tihe United States makes a treaty
with state A providing for protection of migratory birds and stating that the parties will
enact the necessary measures for carrying out the terms of the treaty .... When the
treaty becomes binding between the United States and A, it is not self-executing and
does not take effect as domestic law of the United States until the enactment of Congres-
sional legislation implementing its provisions." RESTATEmENT, supra note 7, § 141, illus-
tration 2.
15. L. HENKIN, supra note 6, at 157-58.
16. Id.
17. Article II, § 3 provides in relevant part that "[the President shall] take care that
the laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
18. See L. HENKIN, supra note 6, at 161-63, for a discussion on congressional imple-
mentation of treaties.
19. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, United States-Mex-
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ada,2 0 Bolivia,2 1 Panama,2 2 Peru2" and Turkey.24 Pursuant to constitu-
tionally established procedures,25  the first of the treaties2' was
ratified. 7 Its enabling legislation"s was introduced," passed by Con-
gress"0 and signed into law by the President.s This legislation enabled
ico, 28 U.S.T. 7399, T.I.A.S. No. 8718 (hereinafter Mexican Treaty].
20. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Mar. 2, 1977, United States-Canada,
30 U.S.T. 6263, T.I.A.S. No. 9552 (hereinafter Canadian Treaty].
21. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Feb. 10, 1978, United States-Bolivia,
30 U.S.T. 796, T.I.A.S, No. 9219 [hereinafter Bolivian Treaty].
22. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Jan. 11, 1979, United States-Pan-
ama, 32 U.S.T. 1565, T.I.A.S. No. 9787 [hereinafter Panamanian Treaty].
23. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, July 6, 1979, United States-Peru, 32
U.S.T. 1471, T.I.A.S. No. 9784 [hereinafter Peruvian Treaty].
24. Treaty on the Enforcement of Penal Judgments, June 7, 1979, United States-
Turkey, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 9892 [hereinafter Turkish Treaty.]
25. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
26. The first of the treaties was the Mexican treaty, supra note 19.
27. The Department of State entered into negotiations with Mexico on the subject of
the transfer of prisoners. See N.Y. Times, June 14, 1976, at All, col. 1; N.Y. Times,
Sept. 6, 1976, at A3, col. 2. The negotiations resulted in the signing of a treaty with
Mexico on November 25, 1976. Mexican treaty, supra note 19, at 7399. The treaty was
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. S. EXEc. Doc. D., 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977). Hearings were conducted on the subject. Penal Treaties with Mexico and Can-
ada: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter Advice and Consent Hearings, Mexican
Treaty]. The Senate consented to ratification. S. Exzc. REP. No. 10, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977).
28. Implementation of the treaty required congressional action. Ratification advised
by the United States Senate was subject to the condition "[t]hat the United States Gov-
ernment declares that it will not deposit its instrument of ratification until after the
implementing legislation referred to in article IV has been enacted." Mexican treaty,
supra note 19, at 7399.
29. "Two identical bills were introduced at the request of the President into Congress
providing for implementation of these and future treaties, that is S. 1682 ... and H.R.
7148." 123 CoNG. REc. H35016 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1977) (statement of Rep. Eilberg).
30. Hearings were conducted in the Senate, Transfer of Offenders and Administra-
tion of Foreign Penal Sentences: Hearings on S-1682 Before the Subcomm. on Peniten-
tiaries and Corrections of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) [hereinafter Senate Implementation Hearings] and in the House Implementation
Hearings, see supra note 4. Reports were issued by each committee; in the Senate, S.
REP. No. 435, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); and in the House, H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th
Cong. 1st Seass. (1977), and both are reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3146.
The legislation was passed; for the Senate, see 123 CONG. REc. 30201 (1977) and the
House, see 123 CONG. Rac. 35029 (1977).
31. On October 28, 1977, President Carter signed into law Public Law 95-144, 91
Stat. 1212 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3006A, 3244, 4100-4115; 28 U.S.C. § 2256; 10 U.S.C. §
955 (1982)), providing for the implementation of treaties for the transfer of offenders to
or from foreign countries. Bills Concerning Indochina Refugees and Prisoner Transfers
with Mexico and Canada, 13 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 1672 (Oct. 28, 1977). [hereinafter
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prisoner transfers with Mexico to take place immediately and was in-
tended to apply to similar United States treaties to be negotiated in
the future. 2
2. General Characteristics of the Treaties
These prisoner transfer treaties are structurally similar.3" They
can be divided into thirteen sections based on the following common
elements: (1) statement of purpose; (2) statements of bilateral prisoner
transfer; (3) definitions of terms; (4) conditions of application; (5) des-
ignation of authorities; (6) procedures of transfer request; (7) effects of
transfer grant; (8) prohibition of double jeopardy; (9) retention of ex-
clusive jurisdiction by transferring country; (10) provision for youthful
offenders; (11) provision for legally determined mentally ill offenders;
(12) provision for passing of enabling legislation; and (13) ratification,
duration and termination provisions.
The purpose of each treaty is to promote the social rehabilitation
of the prisoner.34 Transfers made pursuant to the treaties are volun-
tary, requiring consent of the prisoner, as well as approval by both
countries involved. 5 In essence, the treaties require that the remainder
of a foreign sentence imposed on an offender be served in the of-
fender's home country,"6 subject to that country's laws of parole and
Prisoner Transfers with Mexico and Canada].
32. 123 Cong. Rec. H35016 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1977) (statement of Rep. Eilberg). "The
legislation . . . would also serve as a basis for any such future offender transfer treaties."
Id.
33. The Turkish Treaty, supra note 24, however, is somewhat different. See S. EXEC.
REP. No. 24, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979) (Letter of Submittal from the Department of
State to the President). The Turkish Treaty is different from the others in the series
because of Turkey's desire that, insofar as possible, the European Convention on the
International Validity of Criminal Judgments (to which Turkey is a party) be the "point
of departure." Id.
34. Mexican Treaty, supra note 19, at 7401; Canadian Treaty, supra note 20, at 6265;
Bolivian Treaty, supra note 21, at 798; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 22, at 3; Peru-
vian Treaty, supra note 23, at 3.
35. Mexican Treaty, supra note 19, art. I, paras. 2, 3; Canadian Treaty, supra note
20, art. III, paras. 3, 4; Bolivian Treaty, supra note 21, art. V, paras. 2, 3; Panamanian
Treaty, supra note 22, art. III, para. 6, art. V, para. 1; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 23,
art. V, para. 3. (The transferring country is the country in which the prisoner has been
sentenced and the receiving country is the country to which he wishes to be transferred.)
36. Mexican Treaty, supra note 19, art. V, para. 2; Canadian Treaty, supra note 20,
art. IV, para. 1; Bolivian Treaty, supra note 21, art. VI, para. 2; Panamanian Treaty,
supra note 22, art. VI, para. 2; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 23, art. VI, para. 2. The
Mexican and Canadian treaties additionally provide that the receiving country may not
extend the confinement of the offender beyond its original termination date. Mexican
Treaty, supra note 19, art. V, para. 3; Canadian Treaty, supra note 20, art. IV, para. 3.
1986]
N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
probation.3 7 The treaties explicitly bar prosecutions subsequent to
transfer based on the conduct that resulted in the original conviction."
Not every prisoner can partake of the benefits afforded by these
treaties. For example, a prisoner must be a citizen or national of the
receiving country,"' the offense for which he was incarcerated must be
one which is generally punishable as a crime in the receiving country,
and there must be at least six months remaining to be served, at the
time of petition.40 Moreover, an offender sentenced under military laws
is ineligible under any of the treaties. 4 Although the Bolivian, Pana-
manian and Peruvian treaties exclude offenders who have been sen-
tenced to death, 42 the Canadian and Mexican treaties exclude only im-
migration law offenders."' None of the treaties allow the offender to
have review proceedings pending in the transferring country, at the
37. The right of amnesty or pardon is reserved to the transferring country as part of
its retention of jurisdiction to modify a sentence. See, e.g., Bolivian Treaty, supra note
21, art. VII, which provides in relevant part that "[t]he Transferring State shall retain
exclusive jurisdiction regarding the sentences imposed and any procedures that provide
for revision, modification or cancellation of the sentences pronounced by its courts." A
similar provision appears in the other treaties: Mexican Treaty, supra note 19, art. V,
para. 2; Canadian Treaty, supra note 20, art. V; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 22, art.
VII; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 23, art. VII.
38. See, e.g., Panamanian Treaty, supra note 22, art. VI, pars. 1, which states that
"[a]n Offender delivered for execution of sentence under this Treaty may not again be
detained, tried or sentenced in the Receiving State for the same offense for which the
sentence was imposed by the Transferring State." Id. A similar provision appears in the
other treaties: Mexican Treaty, supra note 19, art. VII; Canadian Treaty, supra note 20,
art. VI; Bolivian Treaty, supra note 21, art. VI, para. I; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 23,
art. VI, para. 1. In international law, the recognition of a foreign penal judgment is an
application of the principle of ne bis in idem. M. BASSZOUNi & P. NANDA, 2 INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 269 (1973).
39. Mexican Treaty, supra note 19, art. II, pars. 2; Canadian Treaty, supra note 20,
art. II, pars. b; Bolivian Treaty, supra note 21, art. III, pars. 2; Peruvian Treaty, supra
note 23, art. III, para. 2. Under the Mexican treaty an offender is ineligible for transfer if
he is a domicilary of the transferring state. Mexican Treaty, supra note 19, art. VII, pars.
3.
40. Mexican Treaty, supra note 19, art. II, paras. 1, 5; Canadian Treaty, supra note
20, art. II, paras. a, d; Bolivian Treaty, supra note 21, art. III, paras. 1, 4; Panamanian
Treaty, supra note 22, art. III, paras. 1, 4; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 23, art. III, paras.
1, 4.
41. Mexican Treaty, supra note 19, art. II. para. 4; Canadian Treaty, supra note 20,
art. II, para. c; Bolivian Treaty, supra note 21, art. III, pars. 3; Panamanian Treaty,
supra note 22, art. III, pars. 3; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 23, art. III, para. 3.
42. Bolivian Treaty, supra note 21, art. III, pars. 3; Panamanian Treaty, supra note
22, art. III, para. 3; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 23, art. III, pars. 3.
43. Mexican Treaty, supra note 19, art. II, para. 2; Canadian Treaty, supra note 20,
art. II, para. c.
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time of the transfer request."
A request for a prisoner transfer under any of the treaties must be
in writing." With the exception of the treaties of Canada and Mexico,
transfer procedures are commenced by the Embassy of the receiving
country.46 The Mexican treaty specifies that "[e]very transfer. . . shall
be . ..commenced by the Authority of the Transferring State' 7 and
that "[n]othing in this Treaty shall prevent an offender from submit-
ting a request to the Transferring State for consideration of his trans-
fer."'4 8 The Canadian treaty is the only one that requires the parties to
"inform an offender, who is within the scope of the present Treaty, of
the substance of the Treaty."' In addition, it is the only one that per-
mits the offender to commence transfer procedures.50
3. The Purpose of the Treaties
The emergence of a dispute from a preexisting problem can have a
catalytic effect on the resolution of that problem; international
problems are no exception. In fact, on numerous occasions the emer-
gence of an international problem alone has resulted in the develop-
ment of a treaty to deal with it.51 There is no requirement that an
agreement be the product of a dispute or problem between or among
countries.5" Treaties are entered into for various purposes, including
trade, criminal cooperation and cultural exchange.5 3 What motivates a
44. See, e.g., Bolivian Treaty, supra note 21, art. III, para. 5, which provides in perti-
nent part that "[tihis Treaty shall apply only under the following conditions: (5) That
the sentence be final, that any appeal procedures have been completed and that there be
no extraordinary review procedures pending at the time of invoking the provisions of this
Treaty." Id. A similar provision appears in the other treaties: Mexican Treaty, supra
note 19, art. II, para. 6; Canadian Treaty supra note 20, art. II, para. e; Panamanian
Treaty, supra note 22, art. III, para. 5; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 23, art. III, para. 5.
45. Canadian Treaty, supra note 20, art. III, para. 3; Bolivian Treaty, supra note 21,
art. V, para. 2; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 22, art. V, para. 1; Peruvian Treaty,
supra note 23, art. V, para. 1. (A written request is not specified in the Mexican treaty).
46. Bolivian Treaty, supra note 21, art. V, paras. 1, 2; Panamanian Treaty, supra
note 22, art. V, paras. 1, 2; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 23, art. V, paras. 1, 2.
47. Mexican Treaty, supra note 19, art. IV, para. 1.
48. Id.
49. Canadian Treaty, supra note 20, art. III, para. 2.
50. Id. art. III, para. 3 (to the authority of the transferring state).
51. See J. HENDRY, supra note 7, at 1.
52. As between sovereigns, "treaties are the sole means of adjusting conflicting
claims, of regulating their mutual conduct, of making definite what they can expect from
one another, and how matters stand between them." J. PUENTE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 146
(1983).
53. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade and Commerce, Sept. 23, 1976, United States-
Spain, 28 U.S.T. 1308, T.I.A.S. No. 8512; Agreement on Judicial Assistance, June 12,
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state to enter into a treaty is a potential benefit.54 Because some agree-
ments are primarily national in character, their benefits are not "felt"
directly by any particular citizen, but rather by the public in general.55
Other agreements, although beneficial to the nation as a whole, operate
primarily through individuals, who serve as their direct beneficiaries."
A prisoner transfer treaty is an unequal mixture of the two, with the
individual benefit component far outweighing the public benefit
component.
The executive and legislative materials generated by hearings con-
ducted on the Mexican treaty support this proposition.5 7 In urging pas-
sage of the enabling legislation designed to apply to all of the prisoner
transfer treaties, Representative Eilberg s listed "the humanitarian jus-
tification for its passage" as its first benefit, "the increased possibility
for rehabilitation" as its second benefit and "the increase in favorable
bilateral relations between the signatory countries" as its third and fi-
nal benefit.59
Additional support can be found within the provisions of each
treaty. The requirement of the offender's consent to transfer, if not the
offender's personal initiation of the transfer proceedings, implies only
that the operation of the treaty is dependent initially upon individual
action. The provision lies dormant until an offender activates it. In-
1981, United States-Netherlands, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10734; Agreement on Cultural
and Educational Relations, Feb. 15, 1979, United States-Japan, 31 U.S.T. 381, T.I.A.S.
No. 9615 (entered into force Dec. 24, 1979); Agreement on Weather Stations, Apr. 29-
May 22, 1968, United States-Israel, 19 U.S.T. 5180, T.I.A.S. No. 6510.
54. Legal capacity to create substantive international law is vested in the sovereign
state alone. Still, a private person is capable of having subjective rights under interna-
tional law. A subjective right, however, as a rule, can be enforced only through the coun-
try of such private person. BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra note 38, at 141-42.
55. Id. Treaties of peace or extradiction are examples of agreements whose benefits
are "felt" by the general public.
56. Id. Treaties involving a cultural exchange or a prisoner exchange are examples of
agreements that operate through individual beneficiaries.
57. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
58. Joshua Eilberg, representative from Pennsylvania and Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law.
59. 123 CONG. REc. 35017 (1977). The same view is articulated in S. Exac. RaP. No.
32, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. 1 (1980). There, Senator Stone noted that "the parties to these
agreements generally concur that the agreements are functioning well and respond to the
parties' humanitarian interest in relieving the unusual hardships which a prisoner incar-
cerated abroad encounters"; that the "exchange provisions enhance the prospects for
prisoner rehabilitation"; and finally, that the parties maintain that the agreements serve
"to improve bilateral relations . I..." d  See also S. REP. No. 435, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
10 (1977). "This transfer of prisoners is a part of American concern about human rights,




deed, to the United States citizen incarcerated in a foreign country
where prison conditions may be primitive,60 parole unheard of61 and
discrimination against Americans common,61 the benefits of the treaty
provisions are substantial. Whatever the purported purpose stated at
the beginning of each of the treaties, their actual purpose-from the
United States point of view-is humanitarian. The driving force be-
hind the treaties, therefore, was a Government response to the plight
of United States citizens and their families. 8
Of central importance to each treaty was the provision that per-
mitted the transferring state to retain exclusive jurisdiction over pro-
ceedings intended to challenge, modify or set aside sentences handed
down by that state." This provision generated the greatest amount of
constitutional concern in the Senate advice and consent hearings,16 as
well as in the congressional implementation hearings,6s and these con-
cerns, as well as their treatment by the judiciary in cases brought by
transferees, will be discussed below.
B. Performance Limitations-The Involvement of the
Legislative and Judicial Branches
Performance limitations are those that affect the ability of a state
to perform commitments incurred under a validly concluded treaty.6
In the United States, limitations affecting treaty performance emanate
from three main sources: federalism, Congress and the judiciary."
60. See Advice and Consent Hearings, Mexican Treaty, supra note 27, at 172-237
(statements of former prisoners).
61. See Prisoner Transfers with Mexico and Canada, supra note 31, at 1673. Presi-
dent Carter stated that "in Mexico . . .there is not opportunity for parole for good
service in prison." Id.
62. See 123 CONG. REc. 35021 (1977). In discussing Mexican prison conditions, Repre-
sentative Brown of California stated that "[djiscrimination against Americans is com-
mon; in the words of CBS's 'Sixty Minutes,' American prisoners are regarded as 'walking
cash registers.'" Id. at 35021-22.
63. See 123 CONG. REc. 35020, 35021 (1977) (statement of Rep. Stark).
64. Mexican Treaty, supra note 19, art. VI; Canadian Treaty, supra note 20, art. V;
Bolivian Treaty, supra note 21, art. VII; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 22, art. VII;
Peruvian Treaty, supra note 23, art. VII.
65. See Advice and Consent Hearings, Mexican Treaty, supra note 27 passim.
66. See Senate Implementation Hearings, supra note 30 passim and House Imple-
mentation Hearings, supra note 4 passim.
67. J. HENDRY, supra note 7, at 6, 9-11, 86.
68. Id. at 9-11.
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1. Federalism and the Treaties
Although the Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that the
treaty-making power is vested in the central government," " '[the
principal attacks on the scope of the Treaty Power flew banners of
Federalism and 'States rights.' "o The states argued that treaties
could not deal with matters reserved to them as contemplated by the
constitutional scheme and expressly provided for in the tenth amend-
ment.7 1 This argument was repeatedly made and repeatedly rejected by
the Supreme Court.72 Finally, in Missouri v. Holland, the Court defini-
tively rejected the argument 3 in simply stating that "[s]ince the
Treaty Power was delegated to the federal government, whatever was
within it was not reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. '7 4
The enabling legislation for the prisoner transfer treaties, passed
by Congress and signed into law by the President,"5 is directly applica-
ble to the Federal Government. Accordingly, foreign prisoners in the
Federal Prison System of the United States become potential benefi-
ciaries immediately upon their country's entering into a similar treaty
with the United States. As a corollary, prisoners transferred to the
United States are taken into federal custody. Each treaty, however,
perhaps based on concerns of federalism on the part of the executive
69. Article I, § 10 provides that "[nJo State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation" and that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress ...enter
into any Agreement or Compact with . . . a foreign Power." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
70. L. HENKIN, supra note 6, at 143.
71. See J. HENDRY, supra note 7, at 107-08. The tenth amendment provides that
"[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. X.
72. See J. HENDRY supra note 7, at 108-09 (citing Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14
Pet.) 540 (1840), License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847) and Passenger Cases, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849)).
73. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Justice Holmes stated that "[t]he treaty
in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution.
The only question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general
terms of the Tenth Amendment." Id. at 432-34.
74. L. HENKIN, supra note 6, at 146. Missouri v. Holland notwithstanding, official
American negotiators continued to assert that the United States could not, by treaty,
regulate local activity reserved for regulation by the state. Id. "This position was offi-
cially abandoned by the Department of State in 1932." Id. at n.67. More recently, United
States treaties have included clauses "setting obligations for federal states [that are] dif-
ferent from those of unitary states sometimes with arguments reflecting constitutional
(reserved rights) limitations on the treaty-making powers." Id. The prisoner transfer
treaties contain such clauses. See infra text accompanying notes 75-77.
75. See supra note 31.
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branch,7 6 requires individual state approval for transfer of foreign pris-
oners who are in state custody."
2. Congressional Involvement and Constitutional Concerns in
Congress
Although congressional implementation of enabling legislation for
treaties was discussed in the section dealing with capacity limitations,
this Congressional implementation is a source of limitation on treaty
performance, as well.78 Congress has the power to do what is "neces-
sary and proper" to implement a treaty, even if its action is not within
other congressional power.7 9 For purposes of conflict between the two,
the Supreme Court has treated acts of Congress and treaties as legal
equivalents.80 But the question whether Congress can properly decline
to take action necessary to implement a non-self-executing treaty is
unresolved."1
The greatest concern in Congress over the validity of the treaties 2
76. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Peruvian Treaty, supra note 23, art. V, para. 6, which provides that
"[iJn cases where a Peruvian national has been sentenced by a state of the United States
of America, the approval of the appropriate state authorities for his transfer will be re-
quired as well as that of the Federal authority." Id. A similar provision appears in other
treaties: Mexican Treaty, supra note 19, art. IV, para. 5; Canadian Treaty, supra note
20, art. III, para. 5; Bolivian Treaty, supra note 21, art. V, para. 7; Panamanian Treaty
supra note 22, art. V, para. 7.
As of October 1, 1984, 21 states have legislation permitting state prisoner transfer
under the prisoner transfer treaties. They are in alphabetical order: Arizona, California,
Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. States Authorized by State Legislation to Trans-
fer Foreign Citizen Prisoners to the Countries of Their Citizenship Under Prisoner
Transfer Treaties in Force Between the United States and Certain Foreign Countries,
United States Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division
(1984).
78. See J. HENDRY, supra note 7, at 10.
79. 252 U.S. 416.
80. Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366 (1856): "A treaty, after executed
and ratified by the proper authorities of the Government, becomes the supreme law of
the land, and the courts can no more go behind it for the purpose of annulling its effect
and operation, than they can go behind an act of Congress." Id. at 372; Chae Chan Ping
v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1899). When a conflict
arises between a valid treaty and a valid act of Congress, "the last expression of the
sovereign will must control." Id. at 600.
81. L. TRNE, AMmuANc CONsTrrmroNAL LAW § 4-4, at 168 (1978).
82. See Senate Implementation Hearings, supra note 30, at 124 (statement of Bar-
bara M. Watson, Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of
State).
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was generated by the constitutional implications of the provisions re-
garding the "retention of exclusive jurisdiction by the transferring
country.""3 This provision was indispensable to any agreement, be-
cause neither the United States nor its treaty partner could accept re-
view of each other's judgment."4 The major constitutional issues raised
by the provision were: (1) the legitimacy of imprisoning a United
States citizen based on a foreign conviction that was possibly obtained
by procedures lacking the safeguards of the Bill of Rights"8 and (2) the
limitations placed on United States citizens incarcerated in United
States institutions, to have access to United States courts to challenge
their confinement.8 " The position of the Department of State, with re-
spect to the due process issue, was that a trial conducted in a foreign
country, with lawful jurisdiction over an offender and the offense, was
outside the scope of applicability of the United States Constitution.8 7
With respect to the second issue, the State Department felt that a
waiver agreement could provide an adequate cure." Herbert Wechs-
ler 89 testified that the fifth amendment was inapplicable to foreign
criminal procedure" and that the provision placed no limitation on the
83. See, e.g., Mexican Treaty, supra note 19, art. VI, which provides that "[tihe
Transferring State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any proceedings, regardless of
their form, intended to challenge, modify or set aside sentences handed down by its
courts." Id. A similar provision appears in other treaties: Canadian Treaty, supra note
20, art. V; Bolivian Treaty, supra note 21, art. VII; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 22,
art. VII; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 23, art. VII.
84. See supra note 83. See also House Implementation Hearings, supra note 4, at
136 (Department of Justice responses to questions raised by the House Judiciary
Committee).
85. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of...
liberty. . . without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[Vlirtually every Bill of
Rights guarantee pertaining to the criminal process has been found necessary to due
process of law .... " C. WHITEmDAD, CRIMINAL PRocEDuRE 2 (1980).
86. The Constitution assures the availability of the writ of habeus corpus: "The Priv-
ilege of the Writ of Habeus Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
Congress authorized the federal courts to grant the writ "in all cases where any person
may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution or of any treaty or
law of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254 (1982); see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 330, 331 (1983). "The scope of the writ, insofar as the statutory lan-
guage is concerned, has not been altered since 1867." Id. at 331.
87. Advice and Consent Hearings, Mexican Treaty, supra note 27, at 49.
88. Id.
89. Herbert Wechsler, Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law, has
held the Harlan Fiske Stone Chair of Constitutional Law since 1957 and has written
extensively in the fields of federal jurisdiction, constitutional law and criminal law. See
House Implementation Hearings, supra note 4, at 248.
90. Professor Wechsler stated:
It has been suggested that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment pro-
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availability of the writ of habeas corpus."' In recommending that the
Senate consent to ratification of the treaties," the committee noted
that the treaty provisions had the effect of denying a transferee to the
United States the opportunity to challenge the validity of his convic-
tion in a habeas corpus proceeding. The committee went on to state,
however, that a valid waiver could cure the infirmity.9 3
At the implementation hearings, the waiver issue was the primary
concern." The Department of Justice, emphasizing the importance of
ensuring the voluntariness of a potential transferee's consent, 5
strongly recommended that the Government advise a transferee on the
hibits. . . imprisonment [based on a foreign conviction] if the foreign conviction
was obtained by procedures lacking those safeguards of the Bill of Rights that
the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to impose on state procedures. This
seems to me a wholly insupportable conclusion. The Fourteenth Amendment
was designed to impose limits on the states, including by interpretation limits on
their criminal procedures derived by incorporation from the Bill of Rights. The
Fifth Amendment was no more designed than was the Fourteenth to limit Mexi-
can or Canadian procedures.
Id. at 248.
91. Professor Wechsler stated:
The writ remains available; it is simply a good return that the offender is
imprisoned in accordance with the treaty and its implementing legislation. If the
treaty and the statute are valid, as I believe they are, the detention does not
violate the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. The application
for the writ must, therefore, be denied (28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)).
Id. at 93-94. For an opposing view, see Abramovski & Eagle, A Critical Evaluation of the
Mexican-American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaty, 64 IowA L. REv. 275, 301 (1979).
But see Vagts, A Reply to "A Critical Evaluation of the Mexican-American Transfer of
Penal Sanctions Treaty", 64 IOWA L. REv. 325 (1979); and Robbins, A Constitutional
Analysis of the Prohibition Against Collateral Attack in the Mexican-American Pris-
oner Exchange Treaty, 26 U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 1 (1978). Allen C. Swan, Professor of Law,
University of Miami Law School, also testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on the due process and habeas corpus issues. Swan concluded that the treaty was
constitutionally defensible and that if the Senate felt as a matter of policy that it was
desirable to proceed with the treaty, he could perceive no "important constitutional bar-
rier" to its implementation. Advice & Consent Hearings, Mexican Treaty, supra note 27,
at 94, 97. Professor Swan's views are set forth in greater detail in Stotzky & Swan, Due
Process Methodology and Prisoner Exchange Treaties; Confronting and Uncertain
Calculus, 62 MINN. L. Ray. 732 (1978).
92. S. ExEc. Rap. No. 10, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977). "All the legal opinions re-
ceived by the committee concur in the constitutionality of the treaties." Id.
93. Id.
94. Senate Implementation Hearings, supra note 30, at 2 (statement of Sen. Biden).
95. "A transfer may be accomplished only if the offender consents with full knowl-
edge of the consequences of the transfer." Id. at 25 (statement of Peter Flaherty, then
Deputy Attorney General, United States Department of Justice). "The consent argument
proceeds on the basis of the fact that nobody will be transferred against his or her own
will." Id. at 124 (statement of Barbara M. Watson).
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consequences of consent,"6 as well as on specific procedures to be fol-
lowed in obtaining consent to transfer."7 The Department of State was
responsible for providing counsel to indigent prisoners abroad.9' M.
Cherif Bassiouni" expressed reservations about the participation by
government officials in this part of the process, fearing that conflict of
interest would taint the voluntariness of the waiver and consent. 100 He,
therefore, recommended that "[tihe consent should be done by a judge
or someone appointed by the judge"' 01 and that appointment of coun-
sel be done in the usual manner, through federal defender projects and
other volunteer legal services. 02
The subcommittee also considered several memoranda of law that
examined the legal issues in great detail.103 A memorandum submitted
on behalf of the Department of State concluded that, by itself, trans-
feree consent is an adequate basis for continuing a transferee's impris-
96. Id. at 26-27 (statement of Peter Flaherty).
97. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 4108 (1982) sets forth the procedures to be followed in verifying a
transferee's consent to transfer from a foreign country to the United States. See infra
note 113.
98. Senate Implementation Hearings, supra note 30, at 125 (statement of Barbara
M. Watson). 18 U.S.C. § 4109 (1982) states, in relevant part, that "in proceedings to
verify consent of an offender for transfer, the offender shall have the right to advice of
counsel."
99. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Professor of Law, De Paul University School of Law, is the
author of numerous books and law review articles on criminal law. See Senate Imple-
mentation Hearings, supra note 30, at 145.
100. Congressional Implementation Hearings, Senate, supra note 30, at 138 (state-
ment of M. Cherif Bassiouni). Bassiouni's favorable views are set forth in detail in Bas-
siouni, Perspectives on the Transfer of Prisoners Between the United States and Mex-
ico and the United States and Canada, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 193 (1978). For an
opposing view, see Paust, The Unconstitutional Detention of Mexican and Canadian
Prisoners by the United States Government, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 67 (1979).
101. Senate Implementation Hearings, supra note 30, at 146 (statement of M. Cherif
Bassiouni).
102. Id. at 125. Procedures for appointment of counsel are set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
4109 (1982).
103. Senate Implementation Hearings, supra note 30, at 177-252. The first of these
was Constitutional Problems in the Execution of Foreign Penal Sentences: The Mexi-
can-American Prisoner Transfer Treaty, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1500 (1977). Senate Imple-
mentation Hearings, supra note 30, at 178-205. The second, a memorandum of law, was
the treaty between the United States and the United Mexican States Providing for the
transfer of penal sanctions, prepared by Cetlev F. Vagts and dated December 15, 1976
(the author was Counselor on International Law of the Department of State when he
wrote the memorandum) [hereinafter Vagts]. Senate Implementation Hearings, supra
note 30, at 206-16. The third was a Congressional Research Service Report on the legal
issues raised by the treaty, prepared by Charles Doyle, the Legislative Attorney of the
American Law Division of the Library of Congress [hereinafter Doyle]. Senate Imple-
mentation Hearings, supra note 30, at 217-52.
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onment in the United States.10 4 A Congressional Research Service re-
port distinguished waiver from consent and examined the former in
the light of the argument that conditions in Mexican jails might vitiate
the waiver's voluntariness. 05 The report concluded that it would not,
basing its decision on judicial authority.10 Bassiouni cautioned, how-
ever, that in circumstances significantly below minimum United States
standards, a waiver may not hold up. 10 He, therefore, favored separat-
ing the waiver from the consent to transfer, although requiring execu-
tion of both as a pre-condition to transfer.'
Wechsler found no significant constitutional issue in the provi-
sion. 1 9 He applied a "common sense view" that a treaty conferred a
substantial benefit on transferees with their consent and, accordingly,
found it "implausible upon its face to perceive a potential violation of
the Bill of Rights in such an exercise of the treaty power."" 0 If that
general view is correct, a provision limiting collateral attack on a con-
viction or sentence introduces no additional complexity."' He believed
there is no suspension of the writ of habeas corpus: treaty and statute
being valid, detention does not violate the Constitution, laws or trea-
ties of the United States, so that a prisoner's application for the writ
must be denied."'
In short, in light of the conflicting opinions expressed before its
104. Vagts, supra note 103, at 215. Vagts' views are set forth in greater detail in
Vagts, A Reply to "A Critical Evaluation of the Mexican-American Transfer of Penal
Sanctions Treaty," 64 IowA L. REv. 275, 325 (1979).
105. Doyle, supra note 103, at 235.
106. The report cited United States ex rel. Delman v. Butler, 390 F. Supp. 606
(E.D.N.Y. 1975), citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The Delman court
stated that "the coercive impact of the Hobson's choice of compromising valuable consti-
tutional rights out of fear of greater punishment should they be asserted in full, does not
of itself constitute impermissible coercion." Delman, 309 F. Supp. at 609.
107. Senate Implementation Hearings, supra note 30, at 138 (statement of M. Cherif
Bassiouni; Professor Bassiouni did not cite any authority in support of his caveat).
108. Id. See also Congressional Implementation Hearings, House, supra note 30, at
144 (Department of Justice responses to questions raised by the House Judiciary Com-
mittee). For a refinement of Bassiouni's views, see Bassiouni, A Practitioner's Perspec-
tive on Prisioner Transfer, 4 J. CRiM. DEF. 127 (1978).




112. Id. Professor Abernathy placed the entire controversy in perspective when he
addressed the questions of a citizen's right of access to courts and congressional power
vis-&-vis the courts. House Implementation Hearings, supra note 4, at 223 (statement of
Abernathy). Professors Wechsler and Abernathy agreed, however, that legislatively man-
dated special procedures in respect to transferee consent would ensure its acceptance
constitutionally. Id. at 230 (Prof. Abernathy), 249 (Prof. Wechsler).
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committees, Congress passed the implementing legislation " ' with the
certainty that United States transferees would swiftly challenge their
foreign convictions before United States courts.1 " That certainty was
vindicated in a rash of habeas corpus actions.
3. Judicial Involvement with regard to Constitutional Challenges in
the Courts
As a third source of limitation on treaty performance, the judiciary
may find that the subject matter of a treaty contravenes a provision in
the Constitution and that its application as national law is, thus, un-
constitutional and void.115 The Supreme Court addressed the issue of
constitutional limitations on treaties in several opinions1 6 before Reid
v. Covert,"7 for example, firmly established that treaties are subject to
the constitutional limitations that apply to all exercises of federal
power, principally the prohibitions of the Bill of Rights.1
In Mitchell v. United States,'1 ' the petitioner, a transferee under
the Mexican treaty, filed for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his
113. See supra notes 4, 30 and 31. The statutory text of the section dealing with the
consent issue is at 18 U.S.C. § 4108 (1982).
114. 123 CONG. REC. 35022 (1977). "There is little doubt that American prisoners that
are transfered from Mexican prisons will attempt, in our courts, to challenge the consti-
tutionality of their convictions." Id. (statement of Rep. Brown). Professor Bassiouni also
notes that "there is no question-and I think both the treaties and the legislation con-
template it-that there is going to be a challenge through habeas corpus petitions chal-
lenging the conviction and sentence." Senate Implementation Hearings, supra note 30,
at 146 (statement of M. Cherif Bassiouni).
115. J. HENDRY, supra note 7, at 10. The Supreme Court has stated that interpreta-
tion of treaties is "the peculiar province of the judiciary," and not of Congress or the
Secretary of the Interior. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 2 (1899) (the issue of Jones in-
volved rights under an Indian treaty).
116. In Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1876), the Court stated that it would
require "a very clear case indeed" before it would hold a treaty void. Id. at 237. In Cher-
okee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall). 616 (1871), the Court stated that "[lt need hardly be
said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of
that instrument." Id. at 620-21. In dictum, the Court has embraced, as a constitutional
limitation, Jefferson's view that a treaty "must deal with questions properly the subject
of negotiations with a foreign country." L. TRIBE, supra note 81, at 169 (citing Geofroy v.
Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890)). The Geofroy Court also stated that "it would not be
contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution
forbids .... " Id. at 267.
117. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
118. 354 U.S. at 16-17. In Reid, Justice Black, writing for himself and three other
Justices stated that "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on Congress,
or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 16-17.
119. 483 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
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conviction and sentence by Mexican courts on the grounds of denial of
due process, coupled with his continued confinement in the United
States. He claimed that his waiver had been involuntary, because he
would have agreed to nearly anything to secure his release from the
Mexican prison.2 0 The court accepted Mitchell's version of the facts,
which clearly demonstrated procedures grossly contrary to standards
embodied in the Bill of Rights of the United States. The court, never-
theless, denied the writ,12' finding "Mitchell's constitutional challenge
to article VI meritless.""' ' 2 Mitchell's conviction was determined to
have rested on legitimate Mexican jurisdiction to adjudicate, ' 2 render-
ing it immune from constitutional attack in a United States court. 12' In
response to Mitchell's assertion that his waiver had been involuntary,
the court reviewed the record of the magistrate's hearing22 and con-
cluded that Mitchell had knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights,
if any, to challenge his Mexican conviction in an American court."' 6
In Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Prisons,27 the constitu-
tional challenge was virtually identical to that in Mitchell. Pfeifer, an-
other transferee under the Mexican treaty, appealed a denial of his pe-
tition for a writ of habeas corpus,12 8 contending that those portions of
the treaty and its enabling legislation that deny transferred prisoners
the right to challenge their foreign conviction in United States courts
were unconstitutional.' 2 9 As in Mitchell, Pfeifer argued that his convic-
tion was obtained in violation of due process and that his consent was
not voluntarily given. 80 With respect to the due process argument, the
appellate court held that "the Treaty does not create new rights which
120. Id. at 293-94.
121. Id. at 292.
122. Id. at 294.
123. Id. at 294 (citing Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) for the proposition that a
sovereign state has complete jurisdiction to adjudicate within its borders). Under the
territorial principle of international law, a state has exclusive sovereignty within its own
boundaries. See BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra note 38.
124. 483 F. Supp. at 294 (citing Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901), in which the
Supreme Court stated that the Constitution has "no relation to crimes committed with-
out the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign country").
125. The magistrate's hearing is mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 4108 (1982). See supra
note 113.
126. The court held that petitioner's Hobson's choice alone "does not vitiate the vol-
untariness of the consent, since the Constitution does not forbid 'the making of difficult
judgments.'" Mitchell, 483 F. Supp. at 294 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 769 (1970)).
127. 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 908 (1980).
128. Id. at 875.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 875-76.
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enable a foreign convict to have a review of an otherwise final foreign
judgment." '' The court reasoned that consent to the conditions of the
treaty are a prerequisite to transfer and that the consent "constitutes a
waiver of, or at least an agreement not to assert, any constitutional
rights the offender might have regarding his or her conviction. '""3
Having thus established its view of consent, the critical issue be-
came the validity of Pfeifer's waiver. As in Mitchell, the court ex-
amined the record of the magistrate's hearing and concluded that the
waiver was valid.13 The Pfeifer court, however, avoided addressing
Pfeifer's due process challenge to his conviction by simply refusing to
recognize it.'3 4 The court's reluctance to do so was apparent through-
out the opinion." s Unlike the Mitchell opinion, Pfeifer contained no
detailed recital of the petitioner's allegations, although brief mention
was made of a confession obtained through torture." 6 The court fo-
cused rather on Pfeifer's "agreement" with the United States. In a con-
tract-like analysis, it treated the offer of transfer by the United States
as conditioned on the transferee's promise not to challenge his foreign
conviction in a United States court. Acceptance by the transferee oc-
curred when he signed the agreement. Because the transferee may
have been waiving constitutional rights, however, basic fairness re-
quired that he understand the consequences of his acceptance and that
his action in signing be voluntary."1 7
A contrary decision, Velez v. Nelson,"' precipitated an immediate
131. Id. at 876. The court stated that "a constitutional question arises when a party
is required to relinquish a vested right as a condition for obtaining a benefit." Id. Fur-
thermore, "those who accept the opportunity presented by the treaty lose nothing by
consenting to limit themselves solely to Mexican remedies after the transfer." Id.
132. Id. at 876.
133. Id. at 877.
134. The district court held that the United States Constitution has no relation to
Pfeifer's foreign conviction for a foreign crime. Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Pris-
ons, 468 F. Supp. 920, 923 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
135. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that "the constitutionality of
the conviction which led to the foreign incarceration is not before us." Pfeifer, 615 F.2d
at 876.
136. Id. at 875.
137. Id. at 876. The court stated that "a valid waiver of constitutional rights must be
voluntarily and knowingly made." Id. (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459
(1969)).
138. 475 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1979). The facts clearly showed that petitioners
transferees under the Mexican treaty were physically abused during their interrogation
by Mexican authorities. The court found that the petitioners lived in constant fear, justi-
fiably believing that they would be killed if they remained in Mexico. As a result, Judge
Daly concluded that "petitioners would have signed anything, regardless of the conse-
quences, to get out of Mexico," and granted habeas corpus. Id. at 874.
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reaction from the Mexican Government in which it threatened to sus-
pend future transfers under the treaty.'8 9 In an appeal from that deci-
sion, Rosado v. Civiletti," the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
unanimously reversed the Velez court. Judge Kaufman noted that the
petitioners had "demonstrated that their convictions under the laws of
the sovereign state of Mexico, manifested a shocking insensitivity to
their dignity as human beings and were obtained under a criminal pro-
cess devoid of even a scintilla of rudimentary fairness and decency."" 1
In a lengthy opinion, which includes a detailed factual account by the
transferees, as well as some legislative history and treaty highlights,14 2
the court reasoned that even though the treaty is a valid exercise of the
treaty-making power, s4 the resulting incarceration of American citi-
zens under federal authority is based solely on a foreign conviction, the
basis of which cannot be tested in a United States court.14 4 The court,
nevertheless, held that "a petitioner incarcerated under federal author-
ity pursuant to a foreign conviction cannot be denied all access to a
United States court when he presents a persuasive showing that his
conviction was obtained without the benefit of any process
whatsoever.'"
Having determined that the petitioners had made such a showing,
the court moved onto the merits of their claim, shifting its focus to the
issue of consent. The court applied an analysis somewhat akin to that
applied by the Ninth Circuit in Pfeifer,1" placing the burden on the
Government to show that "it [had] relied to its detriment" upon the
petitioners' promise in their consent agreement 4 7 and that the trans-
feree's consent had been voluntary. The test for voluntariness applied
by the Rosado court, however, unlike the one applied by the District
Court in Velez, was based upon meeting the requirements laid down
by the Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Alford,4 8 a case concern-
139. In accordance with article X of the Mexican treaty, Mexico was entitled to give
notice of termination within ninety days prior to November 30, 1980. Mexican Treaty,
supra note 19, at 7408.
140. 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980).
141. Id. at 1182.
142. Id. at 1183-89.
143. Id. at 1193.
144. Id. at 1194.
145. Id. at 1198.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 126-36.
147. 621 F.2d at 1199.
148. 400 U.S. 25 (1970). See also FED. R CriM. P. 11. In Velez, the lower court had
applied the test for voluntariness laid down by the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Schneckloth concerned the validity of a citizen's con-
sent to a police search of his automobile. The Court stated that "[a]mong the circum-
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ing the voluntariness of guilty pleas. Alford dictated that voluntariness
should reflect a deliberate, intelligent choice between available alterna-
tives. In the context of Rosado, the choice was between continued in-
carceration or repatriation. As both were legitimately available to peti-
tioners, their consent to transfer was judged to be voluntarily and
intelligently made.'49 The Rosado court also stated that the Govern-
ment had relied detrimentally on the prisoners' consent, and, there-
fore, concluded that invalidation would defeat the United States inter-
est in improving relations with Mexico.' 50 In conclusion, the court
commented that the petitioners were not intended to be the only per-
sons whose lot was to be bettered under the treaty. Granting them a
writ of habeas corpus would result in their being the last transferees
under the Mexican treaty.' 5 '
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
With regard to the constitutional issues, the reasoning of Pfeifer
and Rosado are unfocused. The Pfeifer court declined to review the
foreign conviction, stating that its concern was the constitutionality of
the challenged portions of the treaty."5 2 It also declined to decide
whether the United States Constitution has relation to the validity of a
foreign conviction for a foreign crime.'53 The court did, however, state
that "Americans who are incarcerated in Mexican prisons. . . have no
right to relief from United States Courts.' 5 4 Rosado, on the other
hand, upheld the treaty as a valid exercise of the treaty-making
power, 5 but only to the extent that it does not circumvent the proce-
dural and substantive guarantees of the Bill of Rights.se This would
imply that the United States Bill of Rights is operative in foreign
countries.'5 "
stances to be considered in determining voluntariness is length of detention, prolonged
nature of questioning and the occurrence of physical punishment." Id. at 226. In decid-
ing to apply the voluntariness test laid down in Alford rather than that in Schneckloth,
Judge Kaufman reasoned that Schneckloth was a fourth amendment case in which the
Supreme Court was concerned with curtailing overzealous law enforcement officials and
"[because] we are in no position to deter by our decision the acts complained of by
petitioners, [Schneckloth is inapposite.]" See Rosado, 621 F.2d at 1189.
149. 621 F.2d at 1191-92.
150. Id. at 1200.
151. Id.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 139-41.
153. 615 F.2d at 876.
154. Id.
155. 621 F.2d at 1193.
156. Id.
157. In United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, (2d Cir. 1974), the court stated that
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Notwithstanding the differences in analysis by the Second and
Ninth Circuits, denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court in both
cases, as well as a decline in habeas corpus actions by treaty transfer-
rees, lead to the conclusion that the treaties are taken to be valid. The
last reported case involving habeas corpus under a prisoner transfer
treaty examined the statutory requirement of custody for issuance of
the writ. 5 8
In Tavarez v. United States Attorney General, 59 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a writ of habeas corpus to a Mexi-
can national transferee under the Mexican treaty who, after transfer,
escaped from a Mexican prison and re-entered the United States.' s0 In
analyzing the legal basis for custody over Tavarez, the court framed
the question in terms of whether the Attorney General's authority to
exercise custody over the petitioner was lost after the initial transfer
was completed.' 6' The court held that the authority was not lost.'62
After Tavarez, it appears that a writ of habeas corpus will be unavaila-
ble to transferees under the treaties, where the prisoner has been given
the opportunity to have the legality of his confinement reviewed by a
federal court.
Taken together, Pfeifer, Rosado and Tavarez effectively establish
the constitutional validity of the treaties. Future litigation will proba-
bly be modest in scope, turning on the actual compliance with statu-
tory procedures in each case. The remedy to a prevailing transferee,
however, may very well be his return to the transferring country.163
"[tihe Constitution, of course, applies only to the conduct abroad of agents acting on
behalf of the United States. It does not govern the independent conduct of foreign offi-
cials in their own country." Id. at 208 n.9. In Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972), the court pointed out the difference between a United
States trial abroad, which must conform with the Constitution, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1 (1957), and a foreign trial of an American in which "the [United States] constitutional
provisions ... [exert] no force of their own upon the Federal Republic [of Germany] in
that exercise of its sovereignty." Holmes, 459 F.2d at 1218.
158. See supra note 86. See also 39 C.J.S. Habeus Corpus § 18 (1955). What consti-
tutes "custody," which is generally required as a condition to the granting of the writ,
has been left open by statute and is subject to judicial determination. Id. at n.17.
159. 668 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1982).
160. Id. at 806.
161. Id. at 809. The Government argued that when it initially transferred petitioner
pursuant to the treaty it never relinquished "constructive custody" over him. Id. at 807.
162. Id. at 809 (citing Floyd v. Henderson, 456 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1972), which held
that "a sovereign does not lose its power to keep a convict in custody by turning the
convict over to another sovereign for the service of the sentence"). Tavarez, 668 F.2d at
809.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 4114 (1982) provides in part:
Upon a final decision by the courts of the United States that the transfer of
19861
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The effectiveness of an agreement is directly related to how well it
achieves its purposes. Immediately upon entering into a prisoner trans-
fer treaty, the mutual governmental interests in improving relations
between signatory countries is realized. The humanitarian interest,
however, is the main purpose'" of the prisoner transfer treaties, and,
accordingly, their use by eligible offenders is a more accurate measure
of their effectiveness. As of December 31, 1983, pursuant to the trea-
ties, 766 Americans have transferred to the United States,"6 5 and 509
foreign nationals have been transferred out of the United States."6 '
Treaty use has been greatest between the United States and its two
bordering countries, Mexico and Canada. 767 Although the dynamics of
criminal activity make quantitative analysis imprecise, the number of
United States citizens incarcerated in treaty transfer nations today is
significantly fewer than the number imprisoned at the time President
Carter signed the treaty legislation into law."6 6
There can be no doubt that the treaties are desirable and effective
to governmental, as well as to individual, beneficiaries. The newest
treaties' will be as effective in serving their intended beneficiaries.
Isaac Szpilzinger
the offender to the United States was not in accordance with the treaty or the
laws of the United States and ordering the offender released from serving the
sentence in the United States the offender may be returned to the country from
which he was transferred to complete the sentence if the country in which the
sentence was imposed requests his return.
Id. See also supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
165. These figures were compiled by the Office of International Affairs, the United
States Bureau of Prisons and the United States Department of State, and were furnished
by Rex L. Young, Deputy Director, Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division,
United States Department of Justice [hereinafter Figures]. Broken down alphabetically
by transferring country: Bolivia: 22; Canada: 89; Mexico: 627; Peru: 22; Panama: 0; Tur-
key: 6.
166. Id. Transferred to: Bolivia: 6; Canada: 94; Mexico: 395; Peru: 0; Panama: 14;
Turkey: 0.
167. Id.
168. See Prisoner Transfers with Mexico and Canada, supra note 31, at 1673. Presi-
dent Carter stated that "we have 575 Americans in Mexican prisons and we have 250
Americans in Canadian prisons." Id. As of October 16, 1984, 312 American citizens were
in Mexican prisons and 190 were in Canadian prisons. Figures, supra note 164. In addi-
tion, 44 Americans were in Peruvian prisons. S. Exec. REP. No. 32, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1980). As of October 16, 1984, that number was 22. Figures, supra note 164. Approxi-
mately 40 Americans were in Bolivian prisons. S. Exec. REP. No. 22, 95th Cong., 2d Seas.
2 (1978). As of October 16, 1984, that number was 9. Figures, supra note 164.
169. See supra notes 2 and 3 and accompanying text.
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